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ABSTRACT. The subject of this paper is the stand taken by the European Union towards
the complex and decades-long Kosovo issue viewed from an international
ethical perspective. The author is trying to prove that the issue, such as it is,
represents a continuity of an inconsistent attitude of most European states
towards the Serbian state territorial issue, which attitude has been persist-
ing for two decades. The stand taken by the author is that by acquiescing to
the formation and stabilization of a newly-created state in the Serbian terri-
tory, the European Union has actually assumed the role of a medium of
overseas attempts at attaining as painlessly as possible the goal of the
secession of Kosovo, which territory has been proclaimed of special Ameri-
can national interest and hence, of a legitimate influence. During the
process, it was also the unreserved choice of Serbia for a “European future”
after October 5, 2000 that was taken into account. In the conclusion of this
paper, the author points to possible consequences that the method of
resolving this important state territorial issue could have on the stability of
the Western Balkans in near or remote future.
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The diagnosis of this relation (between Serbia and the European Union,
M. R.) testifies, above all, to one paradox: Serbia is striving towards a
complex and far-reaching relation with the EU in the situation in which
the EU is playing a key and increasingly more significant role in the
infringement of Serbia's vital state interests.3
The turn of the two centuries and two millennias in the Western
Balkans region was marked by important changes at the site of a
key extra-regional factor of its political and social dynamics and by
even more significant changes in terms of the content of the rheto-
ric accompanying such dynamics. Having exhausted its modest
explanatory and only slightly more considerable socially mobiliz-
ing and impressive ideological propaganda potentials, at the start
of the new century and the new millennium in the territory of
former Yugoslavia, the term globalization was mostly replaced by
another term, or, more precisely, a programmatic platform, of
“European integrations”. The said concept, or platform, ought to,
rhetorically speaking, reflect the awareness of the European part of
the modern world, which awareness has matured on the basis of
the traumatic experience of the US international political unilater-
alism, of the necessity of an even firmer political, economic and
cultural integration founded on the principles of shared values,4
good will and sincere efforts of all its state and territorial units
which have to be “united in diversity” (In varietate concordia). The
obstacles that the Republic of Serbia, as one of the states resulting
from the ruins of the SFR Yugoslavia, has been facing in, to most of
the proclaimed principles totally divergent processes of its associa-
tion with the politically, economically and culturally integrating
structures of the European Union are numerous, varied and, to a
significant extent, unique. Those their essential properties have
been formed on the fact that the Serbian nation (as an ethnic
element constituting an absolute majority of the multi-ethnic
Serbian society) has, in the past fifteen years (the tendency to
continue in near future as well, in terms of the “open” definitive
statuses of the Republic of Srpska, Vojvodina, Sandzak…) been an
object/victim of thorough and overall disintegrations, which have
been supported, finalized and sanctioned in international legal
terms by the very Euro-Atlantic part of the modern world, i.e. by
3 Cf. Samardžić, 2009, p. 234.
4 Those values, as the basis of the European identity are, in the Euro-affirmatory
and Euro-apologetic spirit, recognized in peace, cosmopolitanism and liberal-
ism. Cf. Rakic, 2010, p. 61.
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the European West and the USA. The incompleteness of those
epochal processes is turning the territories on which they live for
the most part into a freely floating ethnic area, which, also at the
very end of the first decade of the 21st century, is still seeking, or
rather, hoping for, a state form in which to stabilize itself. 
For those reasons, and for many other reasons derived from
them, the project of Serbia’s association with the EU, even at the
level of its rhetoric, “ideal-logical” self-presentation and independ-
ently of the growing prospects for an objective collapse of this
grandiose integrationist enterprise, is increasingly more clearly
proving to be not only a too abstract, but also, in terms of life and
experience, an insufficiently convincing response to all or to at
least the major dilemmas in the field of collective existence that
Serbia has encountered at the beginning of the new millennium.
Furthermore, instead of resolving them in a priority sequence, the
Serbian nation has been compelled, ever the since the start of the
millennium, to resolve them simultaneously (“Both Kosovo and
Europe”), which makes the vision of their future additionally
unclear, its attraction to the population significantly reduced5 and
all the strategies of social development that have been offered so
far -insufficiently effective. Besides, their simultaneous positioning
on the “agenda of what has been demanded”, enables the foreign
political factors of the Serbian present to permanently manipulate
them through conditioning one (“European integration of Serbia”)
by (not) resolving the other (acquiescence to the de facto performed
amputation of Kosovo-Metohija from the rest of the Serbian state
organism,6 break-up/disintegration of the state union with
Montenegro,7 annullment of an important part of the state
attributes of the Republic of Srpska by merging it into the state
body of the unitary conceived Bosnia-Herzegovina,8…), or “resolv-
ing” it in a manner that is to threaten even the minimally
dimensioned Serbian state and territorial interest. Thus the last
(“Eurointegrationist”) phase of break-up/disintegration of the
Second Yugoslavia among ethnic Serbs could, with a strong reason,
be perceived as the final act of its complete thwarting—from the
SFR Yugoslavia, which has integrated the majority of Serbian
5 Serbian citizens’ support to Serbia’s admission to the EU dropped from 64.89%
of April 2008 to 42.4% in January 2012 and has never reached the level from
2012. Cf. http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/naprednjacka_koalicija_ubed
ljivo_najjaca.56.html?news_id=213031
6 Cf. Svoboda, 2010, internet.
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ethnic regions state-wise, through “Serbia proper”, i.e. “Serbia
without the provinces”, to, in terms of tendencies, “the pre-Kuma-
novo Serbia”, or “the Belgrade Pashaluk”.9
In the previous phases of the dissolution of the second state
union of the South Slavs as well, Europe clearly demonstrated its
unprincipled, i.e. morally incorrect approach to one of the major
international political problems the Old Continent faced in the
post-Cold War period. Thus, at the first extraordinary meeting of
its Committee of High Officials, held in Prague in July 1991, the
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), two
thirds of the member-states of which were European ones, “greeted
the re-establishment of the constitutional order of Yugoslavia” by
appointing a president at the helm of the collective presidency,
thus seriously breaching the principle of non-interference in the
internal affairs of a sovereign state.10 That was done with an expla-
nation that two republics in the SFRY Presidency had usurped
power, which was contrary to the Yugoslavia’s Constitution and to
the CSCE Paris Charter, adopted in November 1990. The reality was,
actually, the opposite: 
“the imposing of Croatian representative Stjepan Mesić at the posi-
tion of the SFRY president, despite the fact that he publicly
7 The results of the Montenegrin referendum, which was conducted under the
patronage of the European Union and which ended in the rejection of hundreds
of thoroughly documented complaints to the regularity of the voting process
and by means of which referendum this former member of the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro acquired the status of an independent state with full in-
ternational legal subjectivity, were greeted by an EU high official of the time,
Ursula Plassnik, as “the most impressive achievement of its foreign policy in
the past several years.” (Cf. Politika, 1. juni 2006.) The USA as well, as Ted Car-
penter warned in those days, was glad at the results of the Montenegrin refer-
endum although they will never say so in public. “Ever since the start of the
1990s, America has been supporting everything that would reduce Serbia's
power and influence in the region, which is the effect of the Montenegrin refer-
endum” (Cf. Politika, 1. juni 2006).
8 Thus, in early April 2011, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton signed a
decision whereby the EU is authorized to “sanction all the legal and physical
persons undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.” Cf. http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/ketrin-eston-potpisala-odlu
ku -o-kaznama-za-qrusenjeq-bih-i-dejtonskog-sporazuma.html
9 Some foreign authors confirm, implicitly and not without triumphalism, that
the perception could be correct. See, for instance: Vetschera, 2007, p. 52. et
passim.
10 More on this in: Конюхова, 2007, p. 9–39.
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supported the fragmentation of the country the president of which
he was to be appointed, was anticonstitutional in its very nature, and
the fragmentation of a multinational state without a general consent
within it was contrary to the Paris Charter”, 
explains Zoran Lutovac (Ibid, 77). By the way, at the CSCE Moscow
meeting on “human dimension”, i.e. in the document that was
adopted at that meeting, necessity was expressed for the respect of
the equality of peoples and their right to self-determination, in
accordance with the UN Charter and the relevant norms of the
international law, including those that relate to the territorial
integrity of states, just at the moment when, before the very eyes of
the international public, one of the CSCE founding countries and
members, the SFR Yugoslavia, was fragmented. Moreover, it is well-
known that the disintegration was not based on the right of peoples
to self-determination, but that the very same right was seized by
territorial-administrative units (republics) of former Yugoslavia,
writes Lutovac (Ibid, 41). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“a
Yugoslavia in miniature”), both the CSCE and the EC (the later
European Union) and the whole international community acted in
a quite opposite manner—its territorial integrity was supported
even when it was clear that the Serbs, as one of the three constitu-
tive nations in BIH, were decisively against an imposed political
solution for BIH and even when the Croats renounced the tactical
transitional phase of joint approach with the Muslims, i.e. when
the two sides took up arms against each other. The same attitude
was not to be renounced even when the Muslim side gave up “a
unitary civilian BIH” and when the Muslims started waging war
among their own ranks.
THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE KOSMET ISSUE 
AND THE US NATIONAL INTEREST
Consequently, the role of the European Union in the following,
Kosovo-Metohija phase of foreign policy interference in the geopo-
litical designing of the post-Cold War Western Balkans represented
just a new stage in the years-long inconsistent attitude of most of
its member-states towards the Serbian state territorial issue. Thus,
envisaged in the overall plan for a solution of the status of Kosovo
(known as Marti Ahtisari’s Plan, March 2007) as an international
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instance to supervise independence of Kosovo (Annexes IX and X)
and to substitute that supervisory office for the UN’s adminsitra-
tive role, the EU itself actively sided with the idea of independence
of Kosovo. The extent to which this “plan” resulted from negotia-
tions is testified to by the fact that, of the more than five hundred
amendments of the Serbian delegation to the originally proposed
text, Marti Ahtisari’s team, which also included EU representatives
and experts, did not adopt a single one. Despite the fact that Serbia
had rejected the document, it was submitted to the UN General
Assembly as “a draft status solution”, whereas the EU, even before
it was put forward before the UN Security Council, began not only
the political activities aimed at its wider acceptance, but also the
preparations for its role in the “supervised independence of
Kosovo”, writes Slobodan Samardžić (2009, p. 224). Immediately
after the draft document was presented to the parties (in early
February 2007), which document was to be negotiated upon, the EU
Council of Ministers expressed, in their Conclusions, “full support
to the UN General Assembly special envoy and his efforts in
conducting a political process for the determination of the future
status of Kosovo”. A day after the final version of the UN GA docu-
ment was presented, the Council of Ministers adopted a new joint
action “expanding the EU team's mandate for contribution to prep-
arations for the foundation of a possible international civil mission
in Kosovo, including the EU special representative component”.
Pursuing its fait accompli policy, the EU Council of Ministers, in their
conclusions of 18 June 2007, tried to round off the Kosovo secession
strategy on the international scene. In those conclusions, the Coun-
cil did not only reiterate its support to Marti Ahtisari’s plan, but it
also provided parameters for the international legalization of
secession. It was then that, for the first time, in official EU docu-
ments, Kosovo was proclaimed a sui generis case. In accordance with
that, the adoption of a new UN SC resolution, whereby the SC would
accept Marti Ahtisari’s plan, whereby the plan would substitute for
UN SC Resolution 1244, was proposed. Finally, emphasis was laid on
the decisive role of the EU in “status solution” implementation.
Expecting the final solution to this issue to be reached before the
UN Security Council by the end of July 2007, 
“the EU initiated another joint action, whereby it intended to take
the last step before the expected completion of the process. In that
document, the EU Council of Ministers, among other things, ‘changed
and expanded’ the previous joint action of March 27 in the direction
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of joint activities with the Kosovo authorities, UNMIK and other key
international partners, with a view to transferring power from
UNMIK and preparing status solution implementation” (Ibid, p. 225).
The EU founded its stand on the sui generis character of the
Kosmet case on two arguments, in terms of political propaganda,
which arguments were similar to those that were used as a pretext
for NATO’s aggression on FR Yugoslavia in 1999. In the former of
the two arguments, they alleged that, by infringing upon the
human rights of Kosmet Albanians for years, which, according to
them, reached its peak with a genocide attempt during NATO’s
“humanitarian intervention” in the spring of 1999, Serbia had lost
its right to administer that former province of its. If the argument
was truly such as it was passed off as, i.e. an internationally moral
one, the strength of its universal applicability would bind the inter-
national community to intervene in an identical way and suspend
sovereignty everywhere in the world where thousands of people
were killed. However, the promoters of the new principles did not
demand any retailoring of the state territory of Rwanda after the
genocide exerted by the Hutu against the Tutsi (when some 800,000
people were killed), nor did they demand any permanent separa-
tion of the two irreconcilable entities, nor did they envisage such a
punishment for Iraq (after its repression against the Kurds), nor for
any other country in the world disturbed by short or long internal
conflicts with expressed secessionist elements.
Were we to leave aside the question of the true scale of violence
the FRY federal authorities resorted to in treating Albanian seces-
sionism in Kosmet and were we to accept that they formed a
legitimate basis for the suspension of Serbia’s sovereignty over
Kosmet, then we would have to apply the same criteria of justifica-
tion of aspirations to running a territory to the conduct of Albanian
political participants in Kosmet as well, after the NATO aggression
ended. In that case, the violence—murder, pogroms (ethnic cleans-
ing), discrimination, plundering/property usurpation, destruction
of cultural monuments, all exerted by Kosovo Albanians in the past
fifteen years, in the presence of international authorities, would
result in their losing the historical and moral right to a state of
their own. 
“By mass breaching the human rights of non-Albanians, the
Kosovo Albanians annulled the validity of the moral argument. Thus,
the consequential adoption of moral arguments does not annul
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Serbia’s right to the Kosovo territory, it also annuls the Kosovo Alba-
nians’ right to an independent state” (Nakarada, 2008, p. 126). 
The inconsequential adoption of the argument, such as the one in
effect in this case, detects, however, an authentic quality of an
“argument” to which the external patrons of Kosovo independence
resorted in the final stage. And the argument itself, an 
“‘argument’ of bare practice, not to say bare force (that Kosovo is a
sui generis case), was to be refuted only by another bare practice, the
one that would show in a practical manner that Kosovo is not a sui
generis case, but, on the contrary, that it is a classic illegal secession
case. One did not need to wait too long for such an argument. Several
months after the unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo,
the same thing was done by two Georgian provinces, namely Abkha-
sia and South Ossetia. (To this we should add the ever more intensive
reference to the ‘Kosovo precedent’ from the moment of the unilater-
al proclamation of independence among the supporters and activists
of separatist movements in the Basque Country and Nagorno-Karaba-
kh. It was especially the request for a referendum on independence
of the Basque Country, which the Basque Country regional govern-
ment sent to the central Spanish authorities, that was inspired by the
Kosovo precedent).”11
The case of Crimea, which was Ukrainian until recently, and its
successfully realized secessionist aspirations, also inspired by the
example of Kosovo, confirmed as well that the proclamation of the
uniqueness of Kosovo’s example had proved to be a proclamation of
the death of the international legal order as, it was by that example
that, in the European territory, the principle radically opening a
door to arbitrary logic was promoted. Who will be the next to
11 Cf. Samardžić, 2009, p. 196. At the time when relations between Georgia and its
provinces of Abkhasia and South Ossetia became tense, the EU Council of Min-
isters passed, on May 27, conclusions which read, among other things, that the
Council reaffirms its full dedication to the principle of sovereignty, independ-
ence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized
borders, confirmed in UN SC Resolution 1808 of 15 April 2008. That inconsisten-
cies can assume a more caricatural dimension is confirmed by the fact that, “at
the very same when the EU, the majority of its member-states having recog-
nized an independent Kosovo, is striking a serious blow to the rule of the law, by
breaching the UN Charter, Resolution 1244, the OSCE principles and even the
principles of its own arbitration commission (the so-called Badinter Arbitration
Committee), two of its member-states are blocking Serbia’s rapprochement to
the EU, calling upon it to respect the rule of the law and cooperate with the
Hague” (Nakarada, 2008, p. 13).
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proclaim “the special elements” exempted from the valid legal
norms and on the basis of which criteria they are to do that? What
will happen if the opinions of the main global factors differ in the
assessment if a case is “special” or not? Who will act as an arbitra-
tor? What if, despite the proclaimed “uniqueness”, the
consequences go beyond control, initiating another circle of
tension, secession or violence? Who is to bear the historical respon-
sibility for unforeseen consequences? The questions are numerous,
but so are the arguments that can contest the rashness of support-
ing the idea of the uniqueness of the Kosovo case, i.e. the
allegations that some unique circumstances have been created on
the basis of which the state of Serbia could be permanently
deprived of sovereignty over part of its territory” (Nakarada, Ibid,
p. 130).
The latter of the two arguments justifying the suspension of the
sovereignty of the state of Serbia over its southernmost part is that
(uncontrolled) violence and instability of the region will ensue if
the status of Kosovo is not resolved as an emergency case, in
accordance with Albanian requests.12 This argument is doubly
unconvincing. The USA, NATO and the EU had at their disposal all
the instruments whereby they were able to prevent violence in the
Kosovo territory—from diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions,
political isolation to a military intervention and an international
court—i.e. an entire set of instruments they had already applied
against Serbia.13 As proposed, stopping armament supplies and
disbanding military camps for paramilitary group trainings would
initially suffice, which was in their power. However, instead of
being subjected to a resolute attitude on the inadmissibility of
violence and instead of being confronted, if applied, with a severe
response of the USA and NATO, the world’s most powerful army,
the Kosovo Albanian threat of violence was not only tolerated, but
was also used as an additional form pressure, whereby the Serbs
12 Literally: “If, however, the international community is unable to find a solution,
there is a risk that the Albanian side could, at any moment, cause an armed con-
flict again, in order to attract media attention. The fact that nothing was
achieved for Kosovo as long as the battle against Milošević was conducted by
peaceful means and that it was only an armed intervention that led to changes
and improvement is a lesson that Kosovo Albanians have learnt, but which the
EU and the international state community have not fully understood yet”,
warns the coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Erhard
Bussek (2007, p. 90).
13 More on this in: Radojičić, 2013.
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were counted upon as being exhausted and pacified and incapable
of putting up any significant resistance. 
“The USA and the EU, which keep warning of the threat of violence
if one procrastinates with the recognition of the ’inevitable’ (R.
Holbrooke), are acting as supporters of blackmail—they are raising
blackmail to the level of a serious argument and provide legitimacy
to violence as an instrument of the creation of new states in the terri-
tory of the already existent ones.“14
As Radmila Nakarada concludes, the recognition of independ-
ence of Kosovo represents just a continuation of the commenced
spiral of violence with other means, “a definitive statement on the
essential purpose of the NATO bombing (a violent decomposition of
a sovereign European state) and on the extent of the establishment
of ‘terrifying arbitrariness’” (Nakarada, 2008, p. 9). In the norma-
tive sense, it is the final victory of monoethnicity over
multiethnicity, “as vivid proof that it is not worth making an effort
about the complex internal state arrangements of constitutional
multiethnicity (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina) or about special protec-
tion of minorities (as in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro)”
(Samardžić, 2009, p. 218.), but that it is much better to work on the
creation of ethnically homogeneous state forms as the only reliable
guarantee of their stability and permanence.
Ironically, the role of the European Union in that process
consisted in the fact that, as a proclaimed authority for both
conflicting parties, the EU was to take charge of completing the US
policy of full support to the only one side—the Kosovo Albanian
one. Thus the epilogue of this conflict, which is unilateral procla-
mation and subsequent recognition of independence of Kosovo, 
“is neither international, in terms of a solution to be backed by the
UN, nor European, in terms of a sophisticated decision of autonomy
with international and European guarantees. The epilogue of that
14 Cf. Nakarada, 2009, p. 127. Incidentally, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army—
the armed formation of Albanian separatist rebels, was, in 1998, proclaimed ter-
rorist organization by Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203, where-
as the Federation of American Scientists, which was entrusted with the task of
studying terrorism, ranked it among the 113 most dangerous terrorist organi-
zations in the world. The role of the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist or-
ganization was copiously documented in the Congressional transcripts al-
though many 'progressive' voices from Europe and the USA still regard it as a
liberation movement. See more about this in: Chossudovsky, 2003, p. 273. et
passim.
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conflict is, above all, an American one, which means secession of part
of the territory of a sovereign country, a province of its that has been
proclaimed as an area of a special US national interest and, therefore,
of a legitimate influence” (Samardžić, Ibid, 219).15 
The European Union was merely used as a good means for the over-
seas attempts at attaining the Kosovo secession goal “as painlessly
as possible” in international political sense. One bore in mind in
that respect the fact that, after October 5, 2000, Serbia unreserved-
ly opted for a “European future”. In that operation, the USA left to
the European Union the unpleasant task of the amortization of
Serbia's resistance, considering the already commenced “stabiliza-
tion and association” process, i.e. Serbia’s supposed readiness to,
for the sake of the faster and more efficient completion of that
process, agree to waive part of its state territory without much
hesitation. Since the start of 2010, EU high officials, in contact with
their Serbian “friends”, have been putting it clear that Serbia
cannot count on progress in the process of joining the European
family of nations unless it recognizes “the political reality” in
Kosmet and unless it establishes good neighbourly relations with “a
state” which almost two thirds of the UN member-states still
regard as part of Serbia's territory.16
GEOECONOMY OF THE KOSMET CASE
According to Z. Brzezinski, “a lot had been put at stake in Kosovo”,
which is why it was necessary to suspend Serbia's sovereignty over
it. That included the possibility of controling natural resources,
which make Kosovo “unequalled in the Balkans and maybe in the
whole of Europe as well (E. Ponomareva – Пономарëва)”.
Commenting on the geoeconomy of the Kosovo crisis, Ponomareva
stresses that the lead and zinc deposits in the Province in the mid-
1980s constituted 52.2% of the total Yugoslav resources, that nickel
15 “Historically Serbian, ethnically Albanian, economically European periphery.
[…] However, geopolitically, Kosovo is American” (Hofbauer, 2010, internet).
16 That is just one of the modalities of geopolitical trade, i.e. trade in the space that
has been offered to the state of Serbia ever since the start of the 1990s. Here is
an incomplete list of the remaining: space for time, space for peace, space for
“image”, space for democracy, space for money and economic development,
space for stability of Serbia and the Balkans, space for clearly established bor-
ders,[…] See more about this in: Stepić, 2005, p. 50.
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deposits formed 50%, magnesite deposits 35%, lignite (brown coal)
deposits 53%, while bismuth deposits formed 100%; 14.8% of the
total Yugoslav production of sulphuric acid, 59.9% of silver, 30% of
zinc and 63.1% of purified lead were produced in Kosovo. On the
basis of World Bank data, the value of Kosovo’s mineral resources
amounted to 19 billion dollars before the world crisis began. The
experts of the UN civil mission in Kosovo estimate that Kosovo's
lignite reserves alone, the largest in Europe, amount to 8.3 billion
tons, while Serbian experts believe they total 14 billion tons, which
enables exploitation in the next 150–200 years. The tin and zinc
reserves are estimated at 42.2 million tons (which is three times as
much as in Serbia), the nickel and cobalt reserves have been esti-
mated at 13 million, the bauxite reserves at 1.7 million and the
magnesite reserves at 5.4 million tons.17
Kosovo, as Ponomareva stresses, does not abound in resources
only, but it also has an industrial base for their processing. Thus the
“Trepča” business combine represents the major industrial facility
in the Province. It consists of 14 mines and 8 factories, including a
zinc electrolysis plant, an rechargeable battery plant, a sulphuric
acid production plant, an artificial fertilizer production plant…18
The top industrial facilities in Kosovo also include a mining and
chemical combine, “Kosovo” in Obilić, which boasts more than 10
billion tons of lignite resources and coal repletion and nitrogen
gasification and production facilities, the thermal power plants
“Kosovo A”, of 790 MW in power, and “Kosovo B”, of 680 MW in
power and a smelting plant and refinery for ferronickel production
in Glogovac. The processing industry also has big enterprises in
Priština, Peć, Kosovska Mitrovica, Prizren, Gnjilane, Kosovska
Kamenica and Uroševac.
The events in Kosovo can also be viewed through an energy poli-
cy prism. In mid-2001, immediately after the extradition of
Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal, the construction of a 92-
17 Cf. Ponomareva, 2008, p. 113.
18 Marjorie Cohn writes that, in November 1999, the International Crisis Group
greeted the directive of Bernard Kouchner, the chief of the UN peace forces in
Kosovo and Metohija, that UNMIK should take over the administration of the
entire movable and real property registered in the name of the FR Yugoslavia or
the Republic of Serbia, or in the name of any of its authorities, and which prop-
erty is situated in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; they also issued an ad-
ditional order to the 'peacekeepers' in Kosmet—that UNMIK or KFOR should
take over the Trepča mining complex in a quick and energetic manner. Cf. Cohn,
2000, p. 332.
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km-long trans-Balkan oil pipeline began. The pipeline was designed
to transport oil from Baku to the Supsa port, on the Black Sea coast,
from which it was to be transported to the Burgas port in Bulgaria
on tankers and then through Macedonia and Kosovo to the Adriatic
port of Vlore in Albania. The oil pipeline, as Elena Ponomareva
remarks, was being built by AMBO—an Albanian-Macedonian-
Bulgarian company, owned by the USA. The pipeline was aimed to
transport 750,000 barrels of oil daily. The following companies
cooperated with AMBO: 'Texaco', 'Chevron', 'Exxon', 'Mobil', 'BP',
'Atoco', 'Agip' and 'Total Elf’ .
Immediately after the self-proclamation of Kosovo independ-
ence, an international consortium, formed of companies from Italy,
USA, Great Britain and Albania, announced the finalization of the
Adriatic-Macedonia-Bulgaria (Vlore-Skopje-Burgas) pipeline. The
route was designed in such a way that almost half of the pipeline
was to cross the Albanian territories, mostly through Kosovo. It is
not difficult to guess, as Vladimir Ovchinsky observes, 
“that the project was conceived as a rival of the Burgas-Alexandro-
pouli pipeline, which envisages the supplies of Russian and Caspian
oil to the Mediterranean Sea by bypassing Turkey. The rivals are in a
hurry to build a ‘trans-Balkan’ oil pipeline as soon as possible and
thereby compel Russia to transport its oil across a less favourable
route” (Ovcinski, 2007, according to Ponomareva, 2008, p. 118). 
By the way, 80% of the value of oil is constituted by the expenses of
its transport.
The energy component of the Kosovo issue, as Elena Ponomareva
warns, is directly connected with the military intelligence one.
Thus, in Kosovo, the oil company Halliburton built Bondsteel—the
largest US military base ever since the Vietnam War. In less than
three years, from a tent camp deployed on 400 hectares not far
from the Macedonian border, Bondsteel grew into an autonomous
base boasting state-of-the-art equipment, in which more than 7,000
soldiers, i.e. three fourths of the total number of US soldiers
deployed in Kosovo, are stationed.
Bondsteel has a developed 25-km-long road network, more than
300 facilities encircled by 48-km-long barbed wire and 11 watch-
towers. It also includes residential facilities, shops, a round-the-
clock open gym, a church, a library and the best-equipped hospital
in Europe. It also houses 55 Black Hawk and Apache helicopters. In
near future, Bondsteel is supposed to replace the US military base
stationed in Aviano, Italy. 
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“There are almost 16,000 NATO soldiers stationed in Kosovo and
another one thousand British soldiers are to join them. It is they, and
not the Kosovo army, that are to provide the external and internal
'security' of the province, or rather, they will be controlling the
industry of resources, the fuel industry, the power transport routes
and traffic in narcotics.”19
In addition to all the aforesaid, upon the creation of a new, weak,
economically unsustainable, criminalized and ethnically cleansed
state in the Serbian territory, Serbia, as a potentially “disturbing”
regional factor, after all it has been through in the past fifteen
years, is to be additionally pacified, and the fact that an exemplary
punishment has been inflicted to it is to have a disciplinary effect
on all the other potential “renegade” states in the region and
beyond. It is on such humus that the feelings of a huge national
humiliation and an enormous political injustice prevaling over
members of the Serbian ethnos could be established as a firm foun-
dation for revanchism, a secure pledge of another “settlement of
historical accounts” in the territory of the Western Balkans.
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МИРЈАНА С. РАДОЈИЧИЋ
УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У БЕОГРАДУ
ИНСТИТУТ ЗА ФИЛОЗОФИЈУ И ДРУШТВЕНУ ТЕОРИЈУ
РЕЗИМЕ ЕВРОПСКА УНИЈА И КОСОВСКО ПИТАЊЕ: 
МЕЂУНАРОДНO-ЕТИЧКА ПЕРСПЕКТИВА
Пре9меL ово: ра9а je сLав ЕвроDске уније Dрема сложеном и
више9еценијском косoвском DиLању, са:ле9ан из међунаро9но-
еLичке DерсDекLиве. У њему ауLорка Dокушава 9а 9окаже 9а Lај
сLав, као Lакав, Dре9сLавља конLинуиLеL 9во9еценијско: не9о-
сле9но: о9носа веће: 9ела евроDских 9ржава Dрема срDском
9ржавно-LериLоријалном DиLању. СLановишLе које она засLуDа
јесLе 9а је DрисLајањем на формирање и сLаJилизовање је9не
нове, на срDској LериLорији насLале 9ржаве, ЕвроDска унија,
заDраво, Dреузела уло:у ме9ијума Dрекоокеанских насLојања 9а
се циљ сецесије Косова, Dро:лашено: за DросLор о9 DосеJно: аме-
ричко: национално: инLереса и сLо:а ле:иLимно: уLицаја оJави,
у међунаро9но-DолиLичком смислу, шLо „JезJолније”. У Lом
Dроцесу узимало се у оJзир јасно изражено оDре9ељење срDске
DосLDеLoокLоJарске DолиLичке елиLе за „евроDску Jу9ућносL”
која „нема алLернаLиву”. У закључном 9елу ра9а ауLорка указује
на мо:уће Dосле9ице које Jи начин решавања ово: важно: ре:ио-
нално: 9ржавно-LериLоријално: DиLања мо:ао имаLи Dо сLаJил-
носL ЗаDа9но: Балкана у Jлижој и 9аљој Jу9ућносLи.
КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ: Европска унија, косoвскo питање, Србија, међународна полити-
ка, међународна етика.
